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Abstract: 
 
This paper presents a DSGE model with residential investment and credit-constrained 
households estimated with US data over the period 1980Q1-2008Q4. In order to better 
understand speculative movements of house prices, we model land as an exhaustible 
resource, implying that house prices have asset market characteristics. We conduct an 
event study for the US over the period 1999Q1-2008Q4 which has been characterised 
by a housing boom and bust and examine which shocks have contributed to the 
evolution of GDP and its components over this period. We devote special attention to 
the contribution of non-fundamental shocks to asset prices over this episode.   
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Introduction 
 
This paper analyses the drivers of the US economy since the collapse of the dot com 
bubble in 2001 up to the end of 2008, using a DSGE model which allows for frictions 
in financial markets. It is by now common wisdom that overborrowing of US 
households, especially to finance residential investment, is one of the major causes for 
the current financial crisis which started to unfold at the end of 2007 (see, for 
example, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) or Hatzius (2008)).  
 
While there is little disagreement about the financial market origins of the current 
downturn there is still quite some uncertainty about the drivers of the boom in the US 
economy, since the bursting of the dot.com bubble at the beginning of 2000. Some 
commentators regard the expansion of sub-prime lending, i.e. a reduction of collateral 
requirements asked by commercial banks, as the major source of the current problem. 
Other commentators find that US monetary policy has been too expansionary in 
recent years. Yet another group attributes major importance to a bubble in the housing 
market. Finally, some argue the driving force was revisions in medium to long term 
income growth expectations related to the turnaround in US productivity growth. 
 
Concerning  financial innovation, the rise in popularity of securitized mortgage loans 
led to a decline in lending standards, because banks who passed on the risks had little 
incentives to take particular care in monitoring borrowers. As shown by  Mayer et al. 
(2009), the number of subprime mortgages nearly doubled from 1.1 million in 2003 to 
1.9 million in 2005. The share of non prime mortgages rose from about 10% to more 
than 30% over the same period. The initial easing of credit supply conditions and the 
tightening of credit associated with rising defaults are generally seen as a major factor 
behind the residential investment boom and bust in the US housing market. However, 
increased subprime lending is unlikely to be the only explanation. As emphasised by 
Shiller (2008), using data on the evolution of house prices in different segments of the 
US housing market, house prices did not only rise in the low price segment but also in 
the middle and high price segments. This suggests that other factors than extending 
loans to low income borrowers must have been at work. 
 
The view that monetary policy is to blame is especially argued by Leamer (2007) and 
Taylor (2007). However, there is no consensus on the impact of monetary policy in 
the literature. Del Negro and Otrok (2005) and Fisher and Quayyam (2006), using 
structural VARs, only attribute a small portion of the increase in residential 
investment and house prices to monetary policy. Iacovello and Neri (2007) consider 
this issue in an estimated DSGE model. In contrast to the previous studies they find a 
sizeable monetary policy effect. However Edge et al. (2008), also using a DSGE 
model find that monetary policy only played a minor role, while they identify 'shifts 
in demand' as primary drivers of residential investment.  
 
Shiller (2007) sees the housing bubble as the “major cause, if not the cause of the 
subprime crisis.” He regards the bubble (or misperception) as more important than the 
subprime explanation because price increases not only occurred in the low price house 
segments (primarily finance by subprime loans) but in all price tiers (however to a 
different degree (see 2007, pp. 35-36)).  Instead he regards the generalised nature of 
the boom as a result of “contagion of market psychology”. He sees evidence that the 
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recent housing boom was fuelled by overly optimistic expectations about future house 
price increases, from surveys conducted in 2003 (see Case et al. (2003)). He regards 
feedback loops between initial price increases and media amplifying the significance 
of these price increases by producing “new era” stories and thus encouraging beliefs 
among the public (including banks and rating agencies) in the continuation of the 
initial price increase.  While ex post, with a sharp decline in house prices (of more 
than 30%), the bubble explanation has some credibility, it must be emphasised that 
before the bubble burst there was no consensus among housing market experts about 
the nature of the US housing boom. Even as late as 2006 there were papers written, 
disputing the bubble nature of the boom (see, for example Hwang Smith et al. (2006)). 
It shows the difficulties in disentangling fundamental from non fundamental shocks.    
 
Finally, another explanation that might be relevant relates to revisions in medium to 
long term income growth expectations. The US has experienced a turnaround in its 
productivity growth in the mid-1990s, which even accelerated in the first half of this 
decade. For many, the technological breakthroughs in IT production and the 
widespread diffusion of IT technologies, especially in the service sector, signalled a 
new era of accelerated growth in the US (see Jorgenson and Stiroh (2007) and van 
Ark et al. (2007)). However, starting in 2004  we see a marked decline in productivity 
growth in the US, which has persisted until today (see Kahn et al. (2007) and Kahn 
(2009). The question can therefore be asked to what extent a revaluation of future 
growth projections has contributed to the decline in housing investment, while the 
boom itself could have been fuelled by a series of correlated positive 
income/technology shocks. 
 
In this paper we want to shed some light on how strongly the factors discussed above 
have contributed to US economic developments since 2001 with the help of an 
estimated open- economy DSGE model. Using a DSGE model we can identify shock 
processes and associate them with the four hypotheses presented above. Concerning 
the productivity explanation we identify a TFP growth process (both for final goods 
and for investment). Regarding bank lending we identify shocks to the collateral 
constraint. As to monetary policy we use estimated shocks to the Taylor rule in order 
to measure deviations from systematic behaviour estimated over the whole sample 
period. Finally we identify a housing bubble as a (negative) risk premium shock to the 
arbitrage condition for housing investment, a house price bubble as a persistent 
negative shock to the risk premium of land prices, and we use the arbitrage equation 
for corporate capital to identify stock market bubbles.  
 
The  DSGE model we use in this paper differs from the standard model in two ways. 
First, unlike in the first generation DSGE models where capital and insurance markets 
are regarded as being perfect (see Gali et al. (2007)), we allow for financial frictions 
in the form of collateral constraints on borrowers with high rates of time preference, 
following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),  Iacoviello (2005) and Monacelli (2007). In 
addition, we do not require savers and investors/borrowers to satisfy exactly their 
optimising conditions for savings and investment, i.e. respond to fundamental shocks 
only, but we allow for bubbles, following Bernanke and Gertler. (1999). We use the 
term “bubbles” loosely to denote temporary but persistent deviations of asset prices 
from fundamental values due, for example, to noise traders, herd behaviour or waves 
of optimism or pessimism. Our strategy for identifying bubbles empirically is similar 
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to the approach taken by Chirinko et al. (2001), using GMM estimation. We regard a 
DSGE model as a useful shock accounting device for the following reasons: 
 
1) It allows to look at a multiplicity of shocks. 
2) DSGE models (unlike error correction models) have a well specified theory 
about the adjustment dynamics, thus making distinct predictions about the 
dynamic impacts of particular shocks. 
3) As a special case they allow to characterise an efficient financial market 
benchmark, which can be tested against the time series evidence. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 describes the model with a special 
emphasis on the household sector and housing investment. Section 2 presents 
estimation results and the fit of the model. In section 3 we show how the US economy 
is responding to the shocks discussed above. Section 4 presents our 'event study' for 
the period 1999q1 to 2008q4.   
 
 
1. The Model 
 
We consider the US as an open economy, which produces goods which are imperfect 
substitutes to goods produced in the RoW. Households engage in international 
financial markets and there is near perfect international capital mobility. There are 
three production sectors, a final goods production sector as well as an investment 
goods producing sector and a construction sector. We distinguish between Ricardian 
households which have full access to financial markets, credit constrained households 
facing a collateral constraint on their borrowing and liquidity constrained households 
which do not engage in financial markets. And there is a monetary and fiscal 
authority, both following rules based stabilisation policies. Behavioural and 
technological relationships can be subject to autocorrelated shocks denoted by , 
where k stands for the type of shock. The logarithm of 1
k
tU
k
tU  will generally be 
autocorrelated with autocorrelation coefficient  and innovation .  kρ tε
                                                
k
 
 
1.1 Firms: 
 
1.1.1 Final goods producers 
 
Firms operating in the final goods production sector are indexed by  j. Each firm 
produces a variety of the domestic good which is an imperfect substitute for varieties 
produced by other firms. Because of imperfect substitutability, firms are 
monopolistically competitive in the goods market and face a demand function for 
goods. Domestic firms sell consumption goods and services to private domestic and 
foreign households and the domestic and foreign government and they sell investment 
and intermediate goods to other domestic and foreign firms. Output is produced with a 
 
1 Lower cases denote logarithms, i.e. zt = log(Zt ). Lower cases are also used for ratios and rates. In 
particular we define as the relative price of good j w. r. t. the GDP deflator Yt
j
t
j
t PPp /=
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Cobb Douglas production function using capital  and production workers 
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The term  represents overhead labour. Total employment of the firm  is itself a 
CES aggregate of labour supplied by individual households i. The parameter 
j
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j
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determines the degree of substitutability among different types of labour. Firms also 
decide about the degree of capacity utilisation ( ). There is an economy wide 
technology shock . The objective of the firm is to maximise profits Pr 
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where iK denotes the rental rate of capital. Firms also face technological and 
regulatory constraints which restrict their price setting, employment and capacity 
utilisation decisions. Price setting rigidities can be the result of the internal 
organisation of the firm or specific customer-firm relationships associated with certain 
market structures. Costs of adjusting labour have a strong job specific component (e.g. 
training costs) but higher employment adjustment costs may also arise in heavily 
regulated labour markets with search frictions. Costs associated with the utilisation of 
capital can result from higher maintenance costs associated with a more intensive use 
of a piece of capital equipment. The following convex functional forms are chosen 
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The firm determines labour input, capital services  and prices optimally in each period 
given the technological and administrative constraints as well as demand conditions. 
The first order conditions are given by: 
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Where ηt is the Lagrange multiplier of the technological constraint and rt is the real 
interest rate. Firms equate the marginal product of labour, net of marginal adjustment 
costs, to wage costs. As can be seen from the left hand side of equation (4a), the 
convex part of the adjustment cost function penalises in cost terms accelerations and 
decelerations of changes in employment. Equations (4b-c) jointly determine the 
optimal capital stock and capacity utilisation by equating the marginal value product 
of capital to the rental price and the marginal product of capital services to the 
marginal cost of increasing capacity. Equation (4d) defines the mark up factor as a 
function of the elasticity of substitution and changes in inflation. The average mark up 
is equal to the inverse of the price elasticity of demand. We follow the empirical 
literature and allow for additional backward looking elements by assuming that a 
fraction (1-sfp) of firms index price increases to inflation in t-1. Finally we also allow 
for a mark up shock. This leads to the following specification: 
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1.1.2  Residential construction 
 
Firms h in the residential construction sector use new land ( ) sold by (Ricardian) 
households and final goods ( ) to produce new houses using a CES technology 
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The corresponding aggregator for house prices is given by  
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where we allow for adjustment costs related to changes in house prices. 
 
Firms in the residential construction sector are monopolistically competitive and face 
price adjustment costs. Thus the mark up is given by 
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New and existing houses are perfect substitutes. Thus households can make capital 
gains or suffer capital losses depending on house price fluctuations   
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1.1.3  Investment goods producers 
 
There is a perfectly competitive investment goods production sector which combines 
domestic and foreign final goods, using the same CES aggregators as households and 
governments do to produce investment goods for the domestic economy. Denote the 
CES aggregate of domestic and foreign inputs used by the investment goods sector 
with , then real output of the investment goods sector is produced by the 
following linear production function,  
inp
tJ
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where  is a technology shock to the investment good production technology which 
itself follows a random walk with drift 
I
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Given our assumption concerning the input used in the investment goods production 
sector, investment goods prices are given by 
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1.1.4  Financial intermediaries 
 
The economy is inhabited by savers and borrowers. Financial intermediaries use 
deposits from savers to provide loans to borrowing households. Banks pay a riskless 
rate on deposit, which is equal to the risk free rate on government bonds. Concerning 
the lending behaviour of banks we follow the literature on risky debt contracts, which 
suggest that under conditions of uncertainty it is optimal for the lender to link the 
supply of loans not only to the refinancing costs but also to the net worth of the 
borrower. We implement this supply rule by postulating a mark up for the loan 
interest rate which depends positively on the loan to value ratio (defined as 
)) of the borrower.  ctHtct HpB /(
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This specification yields results which are similar to those obtained with an explicit 
collateral constraint a la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Instead of increasing the shadow 
price of lending as in Kiyotaki et al. here the loan interest rate is increased explicitly if 
the value of the housing collateral declines.  
  
 
1.2 Households: 
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The household sector consists of a continuum of households . A fraction  of 
all households are Ricardian and indexed by r and  households are credit 
constrained and indexed by c. The period utility function is identical for each 
household type and specified as a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
aggregate of consumption ( ) and housing services ( ) and separable in leisure 
( ). We also allow for habit persistence in consumption. Thus temporal utility for 
consumption is given by  
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All three types of households supply differentiated labour services to unions which 
maximise a joint utility function for each type of labour i. It is assumed that types of 
labour are distributed equally over the three household types. Nominal rigidity in 
wage setting is introduced by assuming that the household faces adjustment costs for 
changing wages. These adjustment costs are borne by the household.  
 
 
1.2.1 Ricardian households 
 
Ricardian households have full access to financial markets. They hold domestic 
government bonds( ) and bonds issued by other domestic and foreign households 
( ), real capitals ( ) used in the final goods production sector as well as the 
stock of land ( ) which is still available for building new houses. In addition 
they hold a stock of deposits (D) with a financial intermediary who provides loans to 
credit constrained households. The household receives income from labour, financial 
assets, rental income from lending capital to firms, selling land to the residential 
construction sector plus profit income from firms owned by the household (final 
goods , residential construction  and financial intermediaries ). We 
assume that all domestic firms are owned by Ricardian households. Income from 
labour is taxed at rate tw, consumption at rate . In addition households pay lump-
sum taxes TLS. We assume that income from financial wealth is subject to different 
types of risk. Domestic bonds and interest income from deposits yield risk-free 
nominal return equal to it. Domestic and foreign bonds are subject to (stochastic) risk 
premia linked to net foreign indebtedness. An equity premium on real assets arises 
because of uncertainty about the future value of real assets. The Lagrangian of this 
maximisation problem is given by   
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The investment decisions w. r. t. physical capital and housing are subject to convex 
adjustment costs, therefore we make a distinction between real investment 
expenditure ( ) and physical investment ( ). Investment expenditure of 
households including adjustment costs is given by 
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The budget constraint is written in real terms with all prices expressed relative to the 
GDP deflator (P). Investment is a composite of domestic and foreign goods. From the 
first order conditions we can derive the following consumption rule, where the ratio of 
the marginal utility of consumption in period t and t+1 is equated to the real interest 
rate adjusted for the rate of time preference 
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From the arbitrage condition of investment we can derive an investment rule which 
links capital formation to the shadow price of capital I
t
tK
t p
q ξ= . 
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Where the shadow price of capital is given as the present discounted value of the 
rental income from physical capital 
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Notice, there is a risk premium attached to the discount factor of the arbitrage 
equation for physical capital investment. As shown in the appendix  can be 
interpreted as a non fundamental shock (bubble) to the arbitrage equation. From the 
FOC for housing investment we can derive a housing investment rule, which links 
investment to the shadow price of housing capital 
I
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The shadow price of housing capital can be represented as the present discounted 
value of the ratio of the marginal utility of housing services and consumption 
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We have added a non fundamental shock to the arbitrage equation for housing 
capital in order to capture possible bubbles to housing investment. For the price of 
land we obtain a (quasi) Hotelling rule 
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The growth rate of the price of land must guarantee a rate of return which can be 
earned by other assets, i. e. the growth rate of land must be equal to . Bubbles 
to land prices are captured by the term  
Lt gr −
Land
tu
 
 
1.2.2 Credit constrained households 
 
Credit constrained households differ from Ricardian households in two respects. First 
they have a higher rate of time preference ( ) and they face a collateral 
constraint on their borrowing. They borrow  exclusively from domestic Ricardian 
rc ββ <
c
tB
 9
households. Loans are intermediated by a banking sector which charges a mark up 
over the deposit rate which depends positively on the loan to value ratio (see eq. 10). 
The Lagrangian of this maximisation problem is given by   
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From the first order conditions we can derive the following decision rules for 
consumption 
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And housing investment 
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where again the shadow price of housing capital is the present discounted value of the 
ratio of the marginal utility of housing services and consumption 
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The major difference between credit constrained and Ricardian households is the 
interest rate in both the consumption and the investment rule of the former. Credit 
constrained households face a mark up which depends positively on the loan to value 
ratio. The non fundamental shock to housing investment is constrained to be equal 
across household types.  
 
 
1.2.3  Wage setting 
 
A trade union is maximising a joint utility function for each type of labour i where it 
is assumed that types of labour are distributed equally over constrained and 
unconstrained households with their respective population weights. The trade union 
sets wages by maximising a weighted average of the utility functions of these 
households. The wage rule is obtained by equating a weighted average of the marginal 
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utility of leisure to a weighted average of the marginal utility of consumption times 
the real wage of these two household types, adjusted for a wage mark up  
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where  is the wage mark up factor, with wage mark ups fluctuating around Wtη θ/1  
which is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of 
labour services. The trade union sets the consumption wage as a mark up over the 
reservation wage. The reservation wage is the ratio of the marginal utility of leisure to 
the marginal utility of consumption. This is a natural measure of the reservation wage. 
If this ratio is equal to the consumption wage, the household is indifferent between 
supplying an additional unit of labour and spending the additional income on 
consumption and not increasing labour supply. Fluctuation in the wage mark up arises 
because of wage adjustment costs and the fact that a fraction (1-sfw) of workers is 
indexing the growth rate of wages  to inflation in the previous period.   Wtπ
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Combining (17) and (18) one can show that the (semi) elasticity of wage inflation 
with respect to the employment rate is given by ( W )γκ / , i. e. it is positively related to 
the inverse of the labour supply elasticity and inversely related to wage adjustment 
costs. 
 
 
 
1.2.4 Aggregation 
 
The aggregate of any household specific variable  in per capita terms is given by 
since households within each group are identical. Hence 
aggregate consumption is given by 
h
tX
∫ +== 10 ctcrtrhtt XsXsdhXX
 
(27a)  ctcrtrt CsCsC +=
 
Aggregate housing investment is given by  
 
(27b)  cHtcrHtrHt JsJsJ ,, +=
 
and aggregate employment is given by 
 
(27c)   with . ctcrtrt LsLsL += ctrt LL =
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Credit constrained households only engage in debt contracts with Ricardian 
households, therefore we have 
 
 (28) rtc
r
c
t Bs
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1.3 Trade and the current account  
 
So far we have only determined aggregate consumption, investment and government 
purchases but not the allocation of expenditure over domestic and foreign goods. In 
order to facilitate aggregation we assume that households, the government and the 
corporate sector have identical preferences across goods used for private 
consumption, public expenditure and investment. Let  be 
demand of an individual household, investor or the government, and then their 
preferences are given by the following utility function 
{ }iGiGiii ICICZ ,, ,,,∈
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where the share parameter sM can be subject to random shocks and idZ  and ifZ  are 
indexes of demand across the continuum of differentiated goods produced 
respectively in the domestic economy and abroad, given by. 
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The elasticity of substitution between bundles of domestic and foreign goods idZ  and 
ifZ  is . Thus aggregate imports are given by Mσ
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where  and  is the (utility based) consumer price deflator and the lag structure 
captures delivery lags.. We assume similar demand behaviour in the rest of the world, 
therefore exports can be treated symmetrically and are given by  
CP MP
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where  and  are the export deflator, an index of world consumer prices 
2) 
nd import prices are given by 
3)    
ark-up fluctuations arise because of price adjustment costs. There is also some 
4) 
 XtP , 
FC
tP
, F
tY
(in foreign currency) and world demand. Prices for exports and imports are set by 
domestic and foreign exporters respectively. The exporters in both regions buy goods 
from their respective domestic producers and sell them in foreign markets. They 
transform domestic goods into exportables using a linear technology. Exporters act as 
monopolistic competitors in export markets and charge a mark-up over domestic 
prices. Thus export prices are given by 
 
(3 t
X
t
X
t PP =η  
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(3 Ftt
M
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M
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M
backward indexation of prices since a fraction of exporters (1-sfpx) and (1-sfpm) is 
indexing changes of prices to past inflation. The mark ups for import and export 
prices is also subject to random shocks 
 [ ] kPtktktkkttkPkkkt usfpsfp ,11 ))1((/11 +−−+⋅−−= −+ πππβγση
{ }MXk ,=  
(3     
 
xports and imports together with interest receipts/payments determine the evolution 
5) 
.4 Policy 
e assume that fiscal and monetary policy is partly rules based and partly 
 (36) 
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W
discretionary. Policy responds to an output gap indicator of the business cycle. The 
output gap is not calculated as the difference between actual and efficient output but 
we try to use a measure that closely approximates the standard practice of output gap 
calculation as used for fiscal surveillance and monetary policy (see Denis et al. 
(2006)). Often a production function framework is used where the output gap is 
defined as deviation of capital and labour utilisation from their long run trends. 
Therefore we define the output gap as 
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(37) 
8)   
hich we restrict to move slowly in response to actual values. 
oth government expenditure and receipts are responding to business cycle 
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conditions. On the expenditure side we identify the systematic response of 
government consumption, government transfers and government investment to the 
business cycle.  For government consumption and government investment we specify 
the following rules 
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overnment consumption and government investment can temporarily deviate from 
he transfer system provides income for unemployed and for pensioners and acts as 
1) 
overnment revenues consists of taxes on consumption as well as capital and 
2) 
e assume consumption and capital income tax to follow a linear scheme, but a 
G
their long run targets cgy and igy (expressed as ratios to GDP in nominal terms) in 
response to fluctuations of the output gap. Due to information and implementation 
lags the response may occur with some delay. This feature is captured by a distributed 
lag of the output gap in the reaction function.  
 
T
an automatic stabiliser. The generosity of the social benefit system is characterised by 
three parameters: the fraction of the non-employed which receive unemployment 
benefits and the level of payments for unemployed and pensioners. In other words the 
number of non-participants NPARTPOP  is treated as a government decision variable. 
We assume that unemploym its and pensions are indexed to wages with 
replacement rates Ub  and Rb  respectively and we formulate the following linear 
transfer rule 
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progressive labour income tax schedule 
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where measures the average tax rate, and the degree of progressivity. A simple 
first-order Taylor expansion around a zero output gap yields 
w
0τ
w
1τ
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Government debt ( ) evolves according to tB
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There is a lump-sum tax ( ) used for controlling the debt to GDP ratio according to 
the following rule 
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where  is the government debt target.  Tb
 
Monetary policy is modelled via the following Taylor rule, which allows for some 
smoothness of the interest rate response to the inflation and output gap  
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The central bank has a constant inflation target  and it adjusts interest rates 
whenever actual consumer price inflation deviates from the target. The central bank 
also responds to the output gap. There is also some inertia in nominal interest rate 
setting.  
Tπ
 
 
 
1.5 Equilibrium  
 
Equilibrium in our model economy is an allocation, a price system and monetary and 
fiscal policies such that both non-constrained and constrained households maximise 
utility, final goods producing firms, firms in the construction sector and investment 
goods producer maximise profits and the following market clearing condition for final 
goods holds:  
 
(47)  ttGtGtConstrtinpttt MXICJJCY −+++++=
 
Inputs of final goods are used in the investment goods sector and in residential 
construction (eq. 5 and 8) and the allocation of aggregate consumption and housing 
investment over different groups of households is as specified in equations 27. 
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1.6 Fundamental vs. non-fundamental shocks 
 
In order to fit a DSGE model to the data, either structural shocks or measurement 
error must be assumed and there must at least be as many shocks as there are observed 
variables in the model. Since the seminal work of Smets and Wouters (2007) it is 
common in this literature to try to provide a structural interpretation to shocks and 
capture variations in technology, preferences, policies and institutions via shocks to 
TFP, the marginal utility to consumption, monetary and fiscal rules and mark-ups 
respectively. These shocks can be denoted 'fundamental shocks'. The interpretation of 
shocks to arbitrage equations which explain business fixed investment, residential 
investment (Q–equations) and house prices is more ambiguous. A fundamental 
interpretation can be given to those shocks if one assumes shocks to the adjustment 
cost technology or to preferences (in the case of residential investment) or the rate in 
which new land is created in the case of land prices. Alternatively, shocks to arbitrage 
equations can also be interpreted as non-fundamental or as bubbles. This is the 
identifying assumption we are making in this paper. In particular we ask ourselves, do 
the shocks which we identify over the relevant time horizon for the three arbitrage 
relations resemble movements which look like bubbles? Since we do not want to 
impose restrictions on a specific type of bubble we do not make strong parametric 
assumptions about the error process. However, the estimated shocks to the optimality 
conditions for investment and land prices can nevertheless provide information about 
the type of shock. For example, a finding of declining risk premia in our Q equations 
for investment followed by a rapid rise suggests the presence of a bubble.  
 
In implementing a bubble processes we follow Bernanke et al. (1999).  Consider the 
following asset market relationship according to which the fundamental value of an 
asset is equal to the current return  plus the expected value in the next period 
discounted with the expected return r 
tq
tdiv
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We assume that besides divt, there is a non-fundamental shock  which also 
influences the current price. And we assume that  follows the "near rational" bubble 
process
tx
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(42)       )1(1 tttt raxxE +=+
                                                 
2 We confine ourselves to near rational bubbles for technical reasons (see next footnote). By deviating 
from a rational bubble we implicitly allow for the presence of noise trading which is not eliminated by 
rational speculators. 
3 This restriction allows us to introduce a stationary non fundamental shock into the model. 
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Now we can define the market price  for the respective asset ts
 
(43) , ttt xqs +=
 
which follows the process  
(44) )()))1(1)(1(( 1++=−−+ tttt
t
t
t sEdivss
xar  
In the presence of bubbles the expected return of the asset differs from the 
fundamental return  by the presence of a positive or negative premium. The asset 
price including the bubble obeys the asset price equation with a declining risk 
premium and the risk premium is defined as 
tr
 
(45) 
t
t
t s
xarprem )1( −−=  
and  rises before the bubble bursts and vanishes afterwards.  tx
 
We allow for risk premia in the asset price equations for corporate capital, residential 
housing, land and the exchange rate. 
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2. Estimation results and model fit 
 
Our assumptions on technology imply that domestic and foreign GDP and its 
components are stationary in growth rates. Our model implies that various nominal 
ratios such as the consumption to GDP ratio (cyn), the investment to GDP ratio (iyn), 
the housing investment to GDP ratio (ihyn), the government consumption to GDP 
ratio (cgyn), the government investment to GDP ratio (igyn), the government transfers 
to wages ratio (trw), the trade balance4 share in GDP (tbyn), the wage share (ws), the 
employment rate (L) and the real exchange rate (RER) are stationary. Concerning 
nominal variables we assume that the domestic and foreign inflation target is a 
constant. This implies that domestic wage inflation rate ( ), domestic and foreign 
price inflation (
wπ
π , ) rates and nominal domestic and foreign interest rates ( i , ) 
are stationary, as well as certain price ratios, in particular the relative consumption 
(PC/P), import (PM/P) and export price (PX/P) ratios. Housing (PH/P)and construction 
prices (PConstr/P) ratios are also stationary. These variables, together with the 
exogenous technology shock to the investment good production ( ) and an 
exogenous observed time varying depreciation rate, form our information set. World 
economy series [ , , ΔyF] are considered as exogenous and are modeled as a 
VAR(1) process. To assure stationarity of the Y/YW ratio, an equilibrium correction 
term is added to the ΔyF equation. This introduces a small feedback of domestic 
demand into world demand. The model is estimated on quarterly data for US over the 
period 1983Q1 to 2008Q4 (for data description see appendix). All real series are 
divided by the (linear) trend of active population, to obtain per-capita data
Fπ
F
Fi
IU
i Fπ
5. All the 
exogenous observed processes (world economy, technology shock to investment good 
production, time varying depreciation rate) have been estimated separately to the rest 
of the model parameters. 
The parameters listed in Table 1 are calibrated and kept constant over the estimation 
exercise. Due to a lack of reliable data on tax rates we do not estimate  which 
measures the degree of progressivity of wage taxes, but set it corresponding to the 
OECD estimate of the elasticity of tax revenues with respect to the output gap
Wt1
6.  
                                                 
4 Concerning the import and export shares, we remove shift data so to have zero mean trade balance in 
the data. 
5 The pension component of the transfer rule is also removed from the data prior to estimation: this 
eliminates the trend in the transfer to wage share and only the reaction coefficient  is estimated. Ub
6 The OECD calculates an elasticity of income tax revenue with respect to the output gap of 1.5 and an 
elasticity of the wage bill w.r.t. the gap of 0.7. This implies an elasticity of the tax rate w.r.t. to output 
gap of 0.8. 
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TABLE 1. Calibrated parameters 
 
 
Structural parameters Steady states  
α  0.697 cgy  0.157 
Gα  0.9 igy  0.0301 
rβ  0.992 UIg  0 
cβ  0.96 π ,  Fπ 0.005 
δ  0.025 popWg  0.0028214 
Gδ  0.0125 Yg , YFg  0.0045 
houseδ  0.01 UPg   0.003875 
τB 0.0025 ucap  1 
τDEF 0.075 L  0.706 
bT 2.4 θ  1.6 
dσ  12.5 TRWS 0.187 
INOMρ ,   Cρ 0 CIH /  0.1 
TBρ ,  χρ 0.975 CC CIH /  0.07 
Kt ,  ct [0.2,0.1] Ls  0.3 
w
0τ ,  w1τ [0.15, 0.8] LLAGE 0.97 
Risk, premlande 510−  UCAPLAGE 0.99 
 
 
Other parameters are determined according to steady state constraints: 
• )1/KSN-(1*)-(1 1, ατγ =ucap , determined in order to assure the steady state 
constraint ucap = 1, where PPIY  is the nominal capital to GDP 
share. 
KKSN /*/=
• ϑ  is determined in order to assure the steady state condition  706.0=L ; 
• cHs  and rHs  are determined to assure calibrated steady state conditions 
CIH / =0.1 and 
CC
CIH / =0.07 based on available information on the housing 
sector; 
 
For both government consumption and investment, reaction rules have been adopted 
responding to the output gap plus an error correction to assure stationarity of the 
nominal shares to GDP. Thus, the estimated government consumption rule takes the 
form   
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(47)
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The model parameters are estimated applying the Bayesian approach as, e.g., 
Schorfheide (2000), Smets and Wouters (2003). From the computational point of 
view, the DYNARE toolbox for MATLAB has been applied (Juillard, 1996-2005).  
 
 
2.1 Prior distributions 
 
Exogenous AR shocks have beta distributions for auto-correlation coefficients with 
prior mean at 0.85 except for the government consumption and price mark-up shocks, 
where we set prior mean to 0.5 (i.e. we did not have any ‘preference’ between a 
persistent shock or a white noise). Standard errors have prior gamma distributions, 
with prior mean values at  
• 0.5% for shocks to capital and foreign asset risk premia, government 
consumption, investment, transfers; 
• 1% for technology, labour demand, preference, housing and land risk premia 
and loan-to-value target shocks; 
• 0.25% for monetary shock and shock to PC equation; 
• 5% for preference leisure shocks; 
• 10% for mark-up shocks  
 
For the fiscal parameters, we set a prior around zero for τCG and τIG, to let the data 
drive pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical reaction of government consumption and 
investment to changes in the output gap. For transfers we set a prior mean of bU at 0.2 
with a quite wide range [0; 0.4].  Persistence in the government spending and 
investment rule has a prior at 0.5. 
 
For price and wage rigidities we roughly follow Smets and Wouters (2003) with prior 
mean at 4 (prices) and 12 (wages). Capital and labour adjustment costs have prior 
mean at 30, while for investment the prior is smaller (15). The prior for habit 
persistence in consumption is set at 0.7. Substitution elasticities between domestic and 
foreign goods have prior gamma distributions with mean 1.25 and standard deviation 
0.5 , while that for housing services is set to 0.5 (std 0.1). Substitution elasticity for 
land is also set to 0.5 (std 0.2). We set the uniform prior mean of the share of 
Ricardian households ( ( )crr sss + ) to 0.5. The prior for the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution is set to 0.5. Finally, the share of forward looking behaviour in hybrid 
Phillips curves and the price indexation coefficients have prior mean at 0.7 in the 
range [0, 1].  
 
 
2.2 Posterior estimation 
 
Posterior mode estimation has been performed. The shape of the likelihood at the 
posterior mode and the Hessian condition number have been considered to rule out 
major identification problems for some parameters. In Table 2.1 we show prior 
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distributions and posterior mode estimations of our structural parameters (see Table 
A1 in the annex for estimates of standard errors of shocks and AR coefficients of 
autocorrelated shocks).  
 
 
TABLE 2.1: Estimation Results for structural parameters 
 
 
Parameter name 
 
Prior Posterior 
  distrib mean std mean interval 
)( rc
r
ss
s
+
 
SNLC unif 0.5 0.2887 0.342 0.164 0.522
cσ  SIGCE gamma 2 0.75 1.199 0.910 1.481
Hσ  SIGHE gamma 0.5 0.1 0.502 0.340 0.663
h HABE beta 0.7 0.1 0.740 0.672 0.807
κ  KAPPAE gamma 0.5 0.2 0.375 0.155 0.581
 rp RPREMK beta 0.024 0.0047 0.028 0.024 0.032
C
tχ  RISKCCE gamma 1 0.5 0.738 0.289 1.161
 γucap,2 GAMUCAP2E gamma 0.1 0.04 0.100 0.047 0.150
Xω  SE beta 0.87 0.04 0.900 0.889 0.910
Xσ  SIGEXE gamma 1.25 0.5 0.981 0.746 1.213
Mσ  SIGIME gamma 1.25 0.5 0.894 0.642 1.148
PCPMρ  RHOPCPME beta 0.5 0.2 0.671 0.474 0.881
PWPXρ  RHOPWPXE beta 0.5 0.2 0.358 0.216 0.496
INOM
Lagτ  ILAGE beta 0.85 0.075 0.931 0.912 0.951
INOM
πτ  TINFE beta 2 0.4 2.187 1.668 2.703
IINOM
Y 1,τ  TY1E beta 0.3 0.2 0.230 0.092 0.357
INOM
Y 2,τ  TY2E beta 0.3 0.2 0.198 0.154 0.242
CG
Lagτ  GSLAGE beta 0 0.4 -0.562 -0.718 -0.407
CG
Adjτ  GVECM beta -0.5 0.2 -0.048 -0.086 -0.007
CG
0τ  G1E beta 0 0.6 -0.331 -0.653 0.002
CG
1τ  G2E beta 0 0.6 0.249 -0.089 0.591
IG
Lagτ  IGSLAGE beta 0 0.4 -0.160 -0.301 -0.012
IG
Adjτ  IGVECM beta -0.5 0.2 -0.741 -0.941 -0.543
IG
0τ  IG1E beta 0 0.6 -0.324 -0.949 0.297
IG
1τ  IG2E beta 0 0.6 -0.225 -0.921 0.454
bU BU beta 0.2 0.1 0.222 0.176 0.268
Hγ  GAMHOUSEE gamma 30 20 16.864 4.489 28.681
IHγ  GAMHOUSE1E gamma 30 20 93.191 52.822 130.682
Kγ  GAMKE gamma 30 20 25.455 14.109 36.917
Iγ  GAMIE gamma 15 10 2.692 0.477 4.738
Lγ  GAMLE gamma 30 20 2.291 0.699 3.807
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Pγ  GAMPE beta 4 2 8.736 7.797 9.703
PConstrγ  GAMPCONSTRE gamma 30 20 54.144 18.760 87.619
Phouseγ  GAMPHOUSEE gamma 30 20 25.697 9.821 40.432
PMγ  GAMPME gamma 30 20 6.128 1.820 10.598
PXγ  GAMPXE gamma 30 20 21.365 2.422 40.689
Wγ  GAMWE gamma 12 4 11.286 7.654 15.019
WRγ  WRLAGE beta 0.5 0.2 0.407 0.169 0.646
Sfp SFPE beta 0.7 0.1 0.792 0.647 0.941
Sfpconstr SFPCONSTRE beta 0.7 0.1 0.886 0.808 0.967
Sfphouse SFPHOUSEE beta 0.7 0.1 0.884 0.801 0.974
Sfpm SFPME beta 0.7 0.1 0.855 0.753 0.963
Sfpx SFPXE beta 0.7 0.1 0.786 0.648 0.927
Sfw SFWE beta 0.7 0.1 0.836 0.714 0.964
Lσ  SIGLANDE beta 0.5 0.2 0.462 0.217 0.706
cs   - - - 0.342  
rs   - - - 0.658  
ϑ  OMEGE - - - 0.212  
γucap,1 GAMUCAP1E - - - 0.081  
c
C
c
H
s
s  
PREFHOUSECCE - - - 0.474  
r
C
r
H
s
s  
PREFHOUSENLCE - - - 0.757  
 
 
The estimated share of credit-constrained consumers is 0.66, which implies 34% of 
households are fully unconstrained. This relatively low share of 'Ricardian' 
households cannot directly be compared to estimates derived from other DSGE 
models which assume liquidity-constrained, or 'rule-of-thumb', households that do not 
save. These models typically estimate a share of Ricardian households between 0.5 
and 0.75. Credit-constrained households intertemporally optimize, like Ricardian 
households, but do this facing a collateral constraint. Allowing for credit constrained 
optimizers reduces the estimated share of Ricardian unconstrained consumers. This is 
in contrast to Iacoviello and Neri (2008), who estimate only 21% of wage income 
accrues to credit-constrained consumers. Our approach differs as their model contains 
an explicit collateral constraint which leads to an increase in the shadow price of 
lending, while we model credit constraints through an explicit increase in the loan 
interest rate if the value of the housing collateral declines. Note that our estimates also 
suggest a degree of habit persistence in consumption of 0.74 and an intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution of around 0.83. The substitution elasticity for housing 
services is estimated at 0.5. 
 
The estimated persistence in nominal interest rate setting is at 0.93 higher than our 
prior. The estimated fiscal response parameters are counter-cyclical. For government 
transfers we find a positive response of transfers to the employment gap (bU =0.22) 
and government consumption and investment respond negatively to the current 
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change in the output gap. Estimates for adjustment cost of capital and investment are 
generally somewhat lower than our priors with the exception of that for housing 
investment which is higher. The share of forward-looking behaviour in price 
indexation is high than expected, and ranges between 0.79 and 0.9.  
 
In Figure 1 we show the one step ahead predictions of the model for the growth rates 
of GDP ( ), consumption ( ), investment ( ), labour ( ), government 
consumption ( ), government investment ( ), government transfers ( ), 
construction investment ( ), as well as for inflations ( , ,
Yg Cg
CONSTR
Ig Lg
π
Gg GIg TRg
houseg constr π π , 
, ), wage inflation ( ), growth rate of investment specific technological 
progress ( ), nominal interest rates ( i , ), nominal exchange rate ( ), world 
inflation ( ), world GDP ( ).  
Mπ Xπ Wπ
YWg
UIg
Fπ
Fi Eg
We also show the fit of real ratios to GDP of consumption (cy), government 
consumption (cgy), and nominal ratios to GDP of government investment (igyn), 
investment (iyn), construction investment (iconstryn), trade balance (tbyn), transfers 
to wages ratio (trw), the real foreign GDP to domestic GDP ratio (ywy) as well as the 
stationary real exchange rate (ER), labour (L), wage share (ws), house to GDP deflator 
(PHOUSE/PY), construction to GDP deflator (PCONSTR/PY), consumption to GDP 
deflator (PC/PY), import to GDP deflator (PM/P), export to GDP deflator (PX/P). 
 
 
 
 
 
 23
FIGURE 1. In-sample one step ahead predictions of the estimated model. (Data are 
grey lines; model predictions are black lines) 
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 2.3 Model comparisons  
 
A widely applied method to assess the validity of the estimated DSGE models is to 
compare them with non-structural linear reduced-form models such as VARs or 
BVARs (see e.g. Sims, 2003; Schorfheide, 2004; Smets and Wouters, 2003; Juillard et 
al. 2006). In Table 2.2 we compare our base model with BVAR models (lags 1 to 12) 
using Sims and Zha (1998) priors. The BVAR estimates were obtained following 
Juillard et al. (2006), combining the Minnesota prior with dummy observations. The 
prior decay and tightness parameters are set to 0.5 and 3, respectively. As in Juillard 
et al. (2006), the parameter determining the weight on own-persistence (sum-of-
coefficients on own lags) is set at 2 and the parameter determining the degree of co-
persistence is set at 5. To obtain priors for error terms we used the residuals from 
unconstrained AR(1) processes estimated over a sample of observations that was 
extended back to 1978Q1 (the DSGE model is estimated over a sample starting from 
1983Q1). The marginal data density of the DSGE has been obtained by the Laplace 
approximation formula (Metropolis runs are in progress). Similarly to other estimated 
DSGE’s in the literature, our base model has better marginal likelihood with respect 
to BVAR’s. Although the robustness of these kinds of results is sometimes criticized, 
for the reason that it may depend on different prior assumptions in both the DSGE and 
the BVAR, BVARs are a potentially useful metric for comparing the out-of-sample 
performance of DSGE models. 
 
TABLE 2.2. Comparison of the fit of the base model and of BVAR’s. 
 
 
 Marginal likelihood 
BVAR(1) 7902.719 
BVAR(2) 7975.419 
BVAR(3) 7989.103 
BVAR(4) 7992.722 
BVAR(5) 7990.816 
BVAR(6) 7998.039 
BVAR(7) 7999.188 
BVAR(8) 8012.401 
BVAR(9) 8017.359 
BVAR(10) 8019.296 
BVAR(11) 8019.332 
BVAR(12) 8019.145 
DSGE model* 8049.21 
* Modified Harmonic mean estimator 
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In Table 2.3 we also report the RSME’s of the 1-step and 4-step ahead predictions of 
the DSGE model and of a VAR(1) that includes error corrections mimicking the long 
run restrictions implied by the model concerning nominal ratios. In Figure 1 bis we 
also show the plots of the 1-step ahead fit of the VAR(1). The in-sample RMSE’s of 
the VAR(1) are obviously better than those of the DSGE, and they are useful to have 
an idea of the ‘upper’ bound of the in-sample fit. This does not obviously imply a 
better performance of the VAR out-of-sample (see above discussion on BVAR 
comparison). It is interesting to note that for some of the observed variables, the 
DSGE performs better in the 4-step than in the 1-step ahead prediction horizons.  
 
TABLE 2.3. Comparison of the fit of the base model and a VAR(1) with error 
corrections reproducing long run constraints of the DSGE model. RMSE’s are 
reported for 1-step and 4-step ahead predictions. 
 
 
   DSGE 
1-step 
VAR(1) 
1-step 
DSGE 
4-step 
VAR(1) 
4-step 
  Ytg 0.004912 0.003244 0.005067 0.00483 
  Ctg 0.004641 0.002796 0.005243 0.004333 
  Itg 0.038447 0.022173 0.03816 0.034519 
IConstr
tg  0.021185 0.012431 0.026052 0.016709 
  Gtg 0.007475 0.004698 0.007512 0.006416 
   IGtg 0.021508 0.014418 0.020965 0.019492 
  TRtg 0.014255 0.009066 0.014986 0.01361 
  Ltg 0.005738 0.002152 0.005756 0.002776 
  Wtπ 0.004954 0.003172 0.005281 0.004047 
  tinom 0.001203 0.000596 0.003399 0.001678 
tπ   0.002752 0.001341 0.004273 0.001623 
C
tπ   0.003798 0.001999 0.005298 0.002865 
Constr
tπ   0.005258 0.002907 0.006914 0.003864 
House
tπ  0.006446 0.004137 0.010206 0.00511 
M
tπ  0.021395 0.012571 0.023228 0.018979 
X
tπ  0.009012 0.00487 0.011352 0.007741 
E
tg  0.027321 0.020023 0.026587 0.023931 
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FIGURE 1 bis: fit of a VAR(1) including VECM corrections matching those 
implied by the  DSGE model. 
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3. Basic model properties 
 
This section discusses basic model properties relating to the shocks we are concentrating 
on in this paper. Figures 2 to Figure 7 show the impulse response functions to six distinct 
structural shocks: an interest rate shock, a technology shock, capital, housing and land 
risk premium shocks and a shock to credit conditions. These shocks reflect the factors 
that, as highlighted in the introduction, are put forward as explanations for the boom and 
bust cycle in the US economy. The figures show the impulse responses of the main 
endogenous model variables to shocks equal to one percent7.  
 
First, we consider an interest rate shock. Figure 2 shows the impulse response functions 
for a temporary 1 percentage point reduction in interest rates. This leads to a hump 
shaped response of output with output peaking in the third quarter. Domestic demand 
increases with corporate investment rising more strongly than consumption. The increase 
in consumption of credit-constrained households is stronger than that of Ricardian 
households and is more persistent. This is related to the time it takes for real wages to 
adjust. Residential investment of credit-constrained households increases more strongly 
than that of Ricardian households and is also more persistent. Consumption and 
residential investment of non-constrained households returns faster to zero and 
undershoots, due to the overshooting in real interest rates. The exchange rate depreciates 
and the worsening terms of trade partly offsets the deterioration in the trade balance due 
to higher imports. The increase in domestic demand is accompanied by a rise in labour 
demand and higher real wages puts upward pressure on prices.  Though inflation is not 
very persistent in the case of a monetary shock it takes about 5 years before the price 
level has approximately adjusted to a temporary monetary shock. Consumer price 
inflation rises slightly more strongly as import prices increase due to the depreciation of 
the exchange rate.8 
                                                 
7 Posterior IRFs, based on one standard deviation of the estimated shocks, with Bayesian uncertainty 
bounds are shown in the appendix. 
8 A fall in interest rates of 100 basispoints on impact raises GDP by almost 0.8 percent at its peak, after 3 
quarters. This is a similar impact multiplier as reported in e.g  Ratto et al. (2009) and Christoffel et al. 
(2008). Inflation peaks in the first quarter and we do not see the hump-shaped response in consumer price 
inflation that is a feature of many estimated VARs. This could be due to our small open economy 
assumption that we do not allow the exchange rate to affect export prices of the rest of the world. This 
implies that the depreciation of the dollar is immediately passed on to domestic consumer prices. 
Experiments show that a hump-shaped inflation response can only be found when the weight on forward-
looking price indexation (sfp in eq. (4d')) is set to values lower than 0.7 (the estimated value is 0.9).  
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FIGURE 2: IRF’s to a negative interest rate shock (computed at posterior mean of deep parameters) 
E_LY E_LC E_LCCC E_LCNLC
1 1 1.5 1
 
10 20 30 40
-0.5
0
0.5
10 20 30 40
0
0.5
10 20 30 40
0
0.5
1
10 20 30 40
-0.5
0
0.5
E_LI E_LIHOUSE E_LIHOUSECC E_LIHOUSENLC
2 3 6 1
10 20 30 40
-1
0
1
10 20 30 40
-1
0
1
2
10 20 30 40
-2
0
2
4
10 20 30 40
-0.5
0
0.5
E_DEBTCC E_INOM E_INFY E_INFC
0.4 0.1 0.6 0.8
10 20 30 40
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
10 20 30 40
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
10 20 30 40
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
10 20 30 40
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
 
 31
 10 20 30 40
-1
0
1
2
3
E_INFLAND
10 20 30 40
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
E_INFHOUSE
10 20 30 40
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
E_INFCONSTR
10 20 30 40
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
E_R
10 20 30 40
0
1
2
3
4
E_E
10 20 30 40
-1
0
1
2
3
E_LER
10 20 30 40
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
E_LWR
10 20 30 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
E_LL
10 20 30 40
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
E_TBYN
10 20 30 40
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
E_INFM
10 20 30 40
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
E_INFX
 
 32
Figure 3 shows the effects of a permanent increase in the level of TFP by 1%. The 
decline in marginal costs leads to a sharp fall in inflation and an increase in domestic 
demand components. The real wage also rises, but there is a negative employment effect. 
This illustrates the demand externality of supply shocks when there are nominal rigidities, 
as highlighted by Gali (1999). Because firms lower prices insufficiently in response to a 
cost-reducing shock, there is a lack of aggregate demand which makes it optimal for 
individual firms to lower employment. The central bank responds to the shock by 
reducing interest rates to offset the deflationary pressures. The response of credit-
constrained households in consumption and residential investment is somewhat stronger 
than that of Ricardian households reflecting a higher interest rate sensitivity. Because of 
the permanent increase in residential investment the land price adjusts instantaneously 
and jumps up. This increase outweighs the decline in construction investment inflation, 
which moves in line with domestic price inflation, and house price inflation rises. The 
depreciation of the exchange rate gives a boost to exports but the trade balance falls after 
an initial improvement as the increase in imports due to higher domestic demand 
dominates. The depreciation increases import prices and as a result consumer price 
inflation falls by less than domestic price inflation.  
 
The most pronounced effect of a risk premium shock (  in eq. 16) is as could be 
expected on corporate investment (see Figure 4). Temporarily lower capital costs give 
rise to a large and persistent increase in physical investment. This in turn gives also rise 
to a prolonged positive consumption response. Aggregate consumption increases in the 
short run despite a decline in Ricardian consumption, because credit-constrained 
consumers raise spending in response to higher labour income. Aggregate consumption is 
also persistently higher because Ricardian consumers increase their consumption over 
time due to higher income from capital. A similar pattern can be observed for residential 
investment with initially a negative response from Ricardian households, followed by a 
gradual increase, and an increase in credit-constrained residential investment. The shock 
raises inflationary pressures and monetary policy responds by increasing interest rates.  
I
tu
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FIGURE 3: IRF’s to a positive 1% technology  shock (computed at posterior mean of deep parameters) 
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FIGURE 4: IRF’s to a negative 1% capital risk premium shock (computed at posterior mean of deep parameters) 
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Temporarily lower capital costs on residential investment (  in eq. 18 and 23) increases 
investment of both types of households but leads to a small shift in spending away from 
consumption (Figure 5). The substitution effect is stronger for credit-constrained 
households.   Increased residential investment also crowds out corporate. The net effect 
on GDP is therefore not very large and short-lived. Land prices increase because of the 
constraint on the supply of land, and although construction price inflation falls initially, in 
line with domestic price inflation, house price inflation increases. 
H
tu
 
 
A lower discount rate on land ( in eq. 19) increases land prices initially (Figure 6). 
However since the shock is perceived to be temporary there is an expectation of a future 
decline in house prices (which increases capital costs for residential investment). 
Therefore, a temporary negative risk premium shock lowers residential investment. This 
leads to a shift in spending from residential investment to consumption, and this 
substitution effect is strongest for credit-constrained households. Note that while this 
shock has a significant impact on house prices, the effect on GDP is relatively small, as 
the decline in residential investment is partly offset by an increase in consumption. 
Land
tu
 
 
Finally, Figure 7 shows the response to a credit relaxation shock (  in eq. 10). A 
temporary relaxation of credit conditions boosts both consumption and residential 
investment of credit-constrained households. Higher real interest rates have a small 
negative impact on consumption of non-constrained households but their consumption 
recovers in later periods. Aggregate consumption rises and the increase in output raises 
inflationary pressures. Monetary policy responds by raising interest rates.   
B
tu
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FIGURE 5: IRF’s to a negative 1% housing risk premium shock (computed at posterior mean of deep parameters) 
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FIGURE 6: IRF’s to a negative 1% land risk premium shock (computed at posterior mean of deep parameters) 
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FIGURE 7: IRF’s to a positive 1% DEBTCC shock (computed at posterior mean of deep parameters) 
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4. Shocks driving the boom and bust cycle  
 
 
We now turn to our analysis of the shocks that drove the US economy in the boom and 
bust cycle starting in 1999Q1 and finishing in 2008Q4. This period covers the final years 
of a prolonged boom period that started in the 1990s and that led to the first recession in 
this century, commonly associated with the bursting of the dot com bubble. It also covers 
the subsequent recovery and build-up of a next boom, in particular in the housing sector, 
followed by a bust in recent years.  
 
The estimated residuals in a DSGE model can be given a structural interpretation as 
shocks to technology, preferences, monetary policy or as non-fundamental shocks 
(bubbles) to asset prices. Given the current policy discussion about the US we 
concentrate in this paper on five types of shocks which are generally regarded as 
important drivers of the US economy in the last decade. These are positive shocks to 
technology, expansionary monetary policy in the Greenspan era, asset price bubbles in 
stock market and housing market, and excessive bank lending associated with the fast 
development of the subprime mortgage market. We capture technology shocks to final 
goods and investment goods production via the shock terms and  which we model 
as random walk processes. We identify shocks to monetary policy as stationary 
deviations of the nominal interest rate from a standard Taylor rule and we capture shifts 
in lending conditions as shocks to the collateral constraint of households . By adding 
exogenous shocks to the discount factors of the various asset market arbitrage equations 
we allow for non-fundamental shocks (bubbles) in the model. In particular we identify 
bubbles in asset price (Q)-equations for corporate investment (stock market bubble), 
as well as residential investment and land prices u (housing bubble) (see section 
1.6 for the bubble interpretation of correlated shocks to asset price equations).  
Y
tu
tu
I
tu
tu
INOM
B
tu
K
H
tu t
Land
 
Figure 8 shows the estimated historical evolution of these fundamental and non-
fundamental shocks of the model over the 1990s and 2000s. The first chart (TFP) shows a 
decline in productivity up to 1995, which flattened out in later years and was then 
followed by a sharp increase in productivity in the first half of this decade which flattened 
off again in 2004, fell slightly and started rising again at the end of our sample. The 
lending conditions shock (DEBTCC) shows a tightening in lending conditions in the 
early years of this decade, but a relaxation since 2004, which was only reversed in 2007. 
The monetary policy shock shows no clear sign of an overly lax monetary stance during 
the build-up of the bubble. If anything, the residual of the Taylor rule was positive over 
much of this time, and only became negative briefly in 2007-8. Note that the last 
observation shows a large positive residual, suggesting monetary policy became 
restrictive when the federal funds rate hit the zero lower bound. According to the 
estimated Taylor rule, interest rates could have been 120bp lower in the last quarter of 
2008. The bottom three charts show the evolutions of the three non-fundamental shocks 
over these two decades. A stock market bubble built up in the second half of the 1990s 
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and burst in 2000-1. In following years a new bubble built up, which burst again in 2007. 
The risk premium on residential investment shows a gradual decline since 2000, which 
came to an abrupt halt and sharp reversal in 2005. A similar pattern is visible in the 
bubble for land prices, with a sharp fall in the risk premium in 2004 and an increase in 
2007-8. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 8. Estimated historical evolution of the main fundamental and non-fundamental 
shocks of the model (1989Q1-2008Q4) 
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Figure 9 now shows the US growth decomposition for our five broad categories of 
shocks, where we have grouped together the two housing shocks. The first striking 
observation is that the 2001 recession does not seem to be associated with a strong and 
persistent negative technology shock. Quite to the contrary, the period from 2001 
onwards is characterised by continued strong TFP growth in the US, which lasts until 
2004. Our estimate of the Taylor rule suggest that monetary policy has been slightly 
expansionary  in 2001-2, when measured against the benchmark of  a standard (Taylor) 
rule oriented policy. Monetary policy supported growth in the recession but remained 
broadly neutral, if not slightly tight (in 2005-6), in the following years. Only in 2008 we 
can see an expansionary departure from the Taylor rule.  
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The primary shock responsible for the 2001 recession is the bursting of the stock market 
bubble  . We estimate a sharp increase in the risk premium in the Q equation for 
corporate investment starting in 2001Q1. This coincides with the fall in US stock prices 
(Dow Jones index) around the third quarter of 2001 and which continued its decline in 
2002. The impact of this bursting bubble remained negative in the following years and 
dragged down GDP growth till mid-2003.  
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FIGURE 9. GDP growth decomposition (1989Q1-2008Q4) 
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Turning to the final years of the sample, we notice a positive impact of reduced collateral 
constraints for credit constrained households, which supported GDP growth from late 
2004 to early 2007. The impact of this shock then turned sharply negative (credit 
tightening). There appears also to have been a positive contribution to GDP growth from 
the housing bubble from 2003 onwards, but this continued till 2006 and turned negative 
earlier. Figure 9 thus suggests that the housing boom, fuelled both by a bubble in the 
housing market and a loosening of collateral constraints, has prolonged the growth 
momentum in the US after the US productivity boom started to fade off in 2004. The year 
2008 is characterised by large negative contributions from credit tightening and the 
bursting of the housing bubble plus a decline in investment. As mentioned before, 
monetary policy reacts in an unprecedented strong manner to counteract these negative 
shocks.  
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Figure 10 shows the contribution of shocks to consumption growth. Initially, productivity 
growth is a major source of consumption growth. But since the second half of 2004 and 
until early 2007 a loosening of credit constraints replaces TFP as a driver of consumption 
growth. In 2008 we identify a sharp tightening of credit as a major explanatory factor for 
the collapse of consumption in the US. The housing bubble only explains a small fraction 
of movements in consumption. It is also interesting to notice that monetary policy 
impacted negatively on consumption over the years 2004 to 2006 but supported 
consumption strongly in 2008.  
 
 
FIGURE 10:  Consumption growth decomposition (1989Q1-2008Q4) 
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Figure 11 shows the shock decomposition for credit constrained consumption growth 
separately. This confirms the significant role of the collateral shock in driving credit 
constrained consumption. A loosening of credit conditions boosted consumption growth 
from mid 2004 till mid-2007, while the tightening in collateral conditions since 2007 is 
the dominant factor behind the sharp fall in consumption growth of this group of 
consumers. 
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FIGURE 11:  Consumption growth decomposition credit-constrained (1989Q1-2008Q4) 
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Unlike GDP and private consumption, the peaks and troughs of residential investment 
appear to be mainly driven by non-fundamental shocks, i.e. there seems to be excess 
volatility of residential investment. Figure 12 shows the contribution of shocks to 
aggregate residential investment growth and Figure 13 focuses on that of credit-
constrained households in particular. The figures suggest that the housing bubble was 
building up since 2001 and started to burst in 2006. From 2003 to 2006, there was also a 
strong positive contribution of the relaxation of credit constraints to residential 
investment growth. Starting in 2006 a large reversal of housing investment takes place 
which we identify as a bursting of a house price bubble. But for credit-constrained 
households the role of the collateral shock, positive till early 2007 and turning negative 
thereafter, is noteworthy.   
 
The housing bubble also drives house prices especially over the years 2001 to 2006. 
Figure 14 shows an abrupt reversal of these shocks, turning negative in 2007. Of all the 
other shocks one can only detect a small fuelling effect of monetary policy on house price 
inflation, but this effect disappeared in 2006. Only in the end of 2008 does monetary 
policy again support house prices.  
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FIGURE 12:  Residential investment growth decomposition (1989Q1-2008Q4) 
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FIGURE 13:  Residential investment growth decomposition credit-constrained (1989Q1-
2008Q4) 
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FIGURE 14:  House price inflation decomposition (1989Q1-2008Q4) 
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5. Conclusion 
 
This paper presents an extension of the QUEST III model that explicitly models housing 
investment and allows for credit constrained households along the lines suggested by the 
recent literature on the financial accelerator mechanism. In order to better understand 
speculative movements of house prices, we model land as an exhaustible resource. This 
implies that land prices, which are an important component of house prices, have asset 
market characteristics in our model and can therefore be subject to fundamental shocks 
and bubbles. We estimate the model over the period 1980Q1 to 2008Q4 and apply it to 
explain the recent boom-bust cycle in the US. We are in particular interested to assess the 
relative contribution of technology, monetary policy, financial innovations and non-
fundamental shocks to asset prices (bubbles) for an explanation of the US business cycle 
over the period 1999Q1 to 2008Q4.  
 
Our tentative conclusions are as follows. First, the 2001 recession appears to have been 
mainly caused by a collapse of the dot com bubble. Second, the 2001 recession did not 
signal an end to the high productivity growth period. In fact, TFP growth remained 
positive until 2004. After 2004 we do, however, observe a strong decline in productivity 
growth. US households and banks may not immediately have been aware of declining 
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productivity trends and continued private consumption and residential investment 
spending patterns. Some empirical evidence on the late detection of trend productivity 
reversals is provided by Kahn (2009) who shows that a significant productivity growth 
regime shift, occurring in 2004 could only have been detected in 2007, using modern 
statistical techniques. Third, monetary policy reacted timely and countercyclically. This 
helped avoiding a stronger recession in 2002 and supported GDP in 2008. Fourth, the 
housing boom which started in 2002 is hard to explain by economic fundamentals. Even 
in the period of high productivity growth between 2002 and 2004, only about 10% of 
housing investment is explained by income growth. Fifth, the expansion of mortgages to 
subprime borrowers has also contributed significantly to the boom. Relaxation of credit 
conditions up to early 2007 boosted private consumption and residential investment, in 
particular of credit constrained households, and the subsequent tightening of conditions 
led to a fall in growth. Finally, the bursting of this housing bubble is an important factor 
driving the current US recession. 
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ANNEX 
TABLE A1: Estimation Results for exogenous shocks 
 
Parameter name Prior Posterior 
 distrib mean std mean interval 
kCσ  E_EPS_CNLC gamma 0.01 0.003 0.016 0.010 0.021
Buσ  E_EPS_DEBTCCT gamma 0.01 0.004 0.013 0.007 0.019
ησ  E_EPS_ETA gamma 0.1 0.04 0.011 0.008 0.013
Constrησ  E_EPS_ETACONSTR gamma 0.1 0.04 0.073 0.030 0.116
Mησ  E_EPS_ETAM gamma 0.1 0.04 0.079 0.042 0.114
Xησ  E_EPS_ETAX gamma 0.1 0.04 0.065 0.021 0.115
TBσ  E_EPS_TB gamma 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003
CGσ  E_EPS_G gamma 0.005 0.002 0.008 0.007 0.009
IGσ  E_EPS_IG gamma 0.005 0.002 0.020 0.018 0.022
Leisσ  E_EPS_L gamma 0.05 0.02 0.107 0.072 0.140
INOMσ  E_EPS_M gamma 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
PCσ  E_EPS_PC gamma 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
FBσ  E_EPS_RPREME gamma 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004
rpσ  E_EPS_RPREMK gamma 0.005 0.002 0.008 0.005 0.011
rphouseσ  E_EPS_RPREMHOUSECC gamma 0.01 0.004 0.009 0.005 0.014
rplandσ  E_EPS_RPREMLANDE gamma 0.01 0.004 0.011 0.006 0.016
TRσ  E_EPS_TR gamma 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003
Wσ  E_EPS_W gamma 0.01 0.004 0.014 0.009 0.020
UPσ  E_EPS_LTFP gamma 0.01 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.008
χρ  RHODEBTCCTE beta 0.85 0.075 0.889 0.806 0.976
ηρ  RHOETAE beta 0.5 0.2 0.921 0.881 0.966
Constrηρ  RHOETACONSTRE beta 0.5 0.2 0.882 0.814 0.955
Mηρ  RHOETAME beta 0.85 0.075 0.847 0.780 0.915
Xηρ  RHOETAXE beta 0.85 0.075 0.910 0.847 0.969
CGρ  RHOGE beta 0.5 0.2 0.641 0.465 0.816
IGρ  RHOIGE beta 0.85 0.075 0.832 0.737 0.937
Leisρ  RHOLE beta 0.85 0.075 0.774 0.688 0.859
TRρ  RHOTRE beta 0.85 0.075 0.946 0.912 0.984
FBρ  RHORPEE beta 0.85 0.075 0.916 0.883 0.949
rpρ  RHORPKE beta 0.85 0.075 0.873 0.821 0.929
rphouseρ  RHORPHOUSECCE beta 0.85 0.075 0.890 0.848 0.933
rplandρ  RHORPLANDE beta 0.85 0.075 0.940 0.917 0.963
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Appendix 2: Identifying disequilibria in the housing market using error correction 
models 
 
An alternative approach to discover disequilibria in the housing market is provided by the 
error correction literature. Such an approach has been provided by McCarthy et al. (2004) 
to the US housing market. In this appendix we present the approach and update the 
estimates to 2008Q4. The starting point is a standard housing demand equation, where 
household aim for  a certain ratio between consumption spending and the housing stock. 
They are willing to reallocate spending from consumption to residential investment if the 
user cost of housing is low or house prices are low compared to consumer prices. Like for 
a standard investment problem the user cost of housing is given by the nominal interest 
rate minus expected house price inflation plus the depreciation rate for houses. 
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It is further assumed that in the short run the supply of houses is predetermined, therefore 
housing demand essentially determines the (equilibrium) house price 
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The equilibrium price reflects demand conditions. It will be high in case consumption is 
high (relative to the existing stock of houses, thus signalling a willingness on the part of 
households to increase demand for houses in order to re-establish an equilibrium ratio 
between h and c. The equilibrium price will also be high if the user cost is low, i. e. in the 
case of low nominal interest rates or high expected house price inflation. With low user 
costs, households are willing to substitute consumption for housing. 
 
The actual house price can deviate from the equilibrium price because of sluggish price 
adjustment. However, given estimates of the right hand side of equation A.2 one can 
compare the "equilibrium price" to the actual house price. When the actual price exceeds 
the equilibrium price, this can be interpreted as a situation where prices exceed their 
fundamental values determined by preferences of households. 
 
Notice, however, this approach is not without problems. Problem number one is a proper 
assessment of future house price expectations. There is nothing in the model which 
determines house price expectations (future house prices) as a function of underlying 
fundamentals (such as real long run income growth, equilibrium interest rate, target 
inflation rate). Generally, house price expectations are modelled as a distributed lag of 
past house prices. I. e; this approach is silent about the existence of house price bubbles. 
(if house prices are accelerating then the implied distributed lag price expectations will be 
below the current price. This lowers the equilibrium price and therefore it may suggest a 
disequilibrium with too high house prices. But notice this result comes about by 
construction there is no economic argument judging the appropriateness of ,the past 
house price evolution). In fact there is the problem that a bubble remains undetected, 
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since any increase in house prices leads to a decline in the user cost which in turn signals 
an increase in the equilibrium price.    
 
 
 
 
Empirical results for the US: 
 
For the empirical analysis we follow Mc Carthy et al. 2004 and estimate the following 
equation 
 
A.2 (      ttt
c
t
h
t uchcpp 21
* )()( αα +−=−
 
For the construction of the user cost we use the (30 year) mortgage rate as the nominal 
interest rate and set the quarterly depreciation rate to 1% and we approximate house price 
expectations with a 12 quarter moving average of past house price inflation rates.. OLS 
results provide the following values for regression coefficients: 
 
Const    1.0463 
1α     1.2151 
2α    -0.1605 
 
The equilibrium price is compared to actual price in Figure 1, which reproduces fairly 
well the results in Mc Carthy et al (2004) for house price data up to 2003. Morever, we 
can see that equilibrium price remains above the actual price up to 2006q1. Two quarters 
before house prices have reached their peak the error correction method signals an 
overvaluation 
 
Figure 1 
Equilibrium house price equation
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The short run dynamics is then described by the following equation: 
h
ttt
h
t
h
t
h
t puccppp 1432
*
111 )( −−− Δ+Δ+Δ+−=Δ λλλλ  
with estimated coefficients 
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1λ     -0.0233 
2λ      0.1104 
3λ     -0.0342 
4λ      0.3893 
 
The RMSE of the one step ahead predictions of house price inflation from this short run 
dynamic equation is 0.0058. 
In this context, QUEST III fit results compare reasonably well, with a RMSE of 0.00624 
for the full specification and 0.00625 for the small housing sector sub-model. 
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Appendix 3: Prior and posterior plots of estimated parameters 
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Appendix 4: Posterior IRF's 
Figure A4.1 Monetary shock 
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Figure A4.2 Technology shock 
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Figure A4.3 Capital risk premium shock 
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Figure A4.4 Housing risk premium shock 
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Figure A4.5 Land risk premium shock 
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Figure A4.6 DEBTCC shock 
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